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[…] general,  then,  traffic  data  may  be  obtained  by  the  government  upon  a  showing  of  mere  “relevance”  (sometimes  augme nted  by  “mate- riality”) to either a law enforcement investigation  or an investigation to  protect  against  international  terrorism. 201  These  requirements  of  “rele-                                                                                                                           194  Id.  § 2703.  195  Id.   196  See id.  § 2709.  197  Id.   198  50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).  199  Id.   200 […]

[…] orking Party after revis ing its propos ed frame wor k in res pons e to criticis m; see W orking Pa rty 29, Opin ion 9/ 201 1, Revised Industry Proposal for a Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment Fra mework for RFI D Applications , 3-4 (Feb. 2011). 14 e mbrace the […]

[…] confidentiality, a “wrongful breach of such confidence, and a betrayal of such trust, would give rise to a civil action for damages naturally flowing from such wrong.” 201 And inFitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass’n, 202 the court found a mortician’s publicity of his use of an airplane to move a casket violated an implied […]

[…] probable cause was unreasonable. 200 Unfortunately, as commentators have pointed out, when the Court has approached what is “reasonable,” it has failed to give “reasonable” any teeth. 201 Therefore, if the government obtains a valid search warrant, in most cases the search or seizure is reasonable so long as it is properly within the […]

[…] Facebook site. 200 Admittedl y, some aspects of this feature are enjoyable, especially when it alerts this user to the “Groups” her friends have joined on Facebook. 201 Through a seven degrees connection, I joined a group entitled, “Save Henry the Pom.” Henry is really a Pomeranian who se owner has created a profile […]

Penn State Law Review Winter, 2010 Articles *809 PEOPLE CAN BE SO FAKE: A NEW DIMENSION TO PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY SCHOLARSHIP M. Ryan Calo Copyright (c) 2010 The Dickensen School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University; M. Ryan Calo This article updates the traditional discussion of privacy and technology, focused since the days […]

[…] § 2510 (2000). 197. 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (2000). 198. 47 U.S.C. § 551(g) (2000). 199. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(f) (2000). 200. 29 U.S.C. § 2009 (2000). 201. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e) (2000). 202. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(e) (2000). 203. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6807, 6824 (2000). 204. Id. § 1681t. 205. S MITH , […]

[…] 2015, https://www.eff.org/files/internet -engineers -letter.pdf . 50 Bambauer, Derek E. “Censorship V3.1,” 18 IEEE Internet Computing 26 (May/June 2013), Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 12-28, September 9, 201 2, accessed August 11, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144004&download=yes . 51 Herold, David Kurt, and Peter Marolt (eds.) “Online Society in China: Creating, celebrating, and instrumentalizing the online carnival,” […]

[…] (LexisNexis 2007); M INN . STAT . ANN . § 13.15 (West 2007); M ONT . CODE ANN . §§2-17-550-53 (2007); N.Y. STATE TECH . LAW §§ 201-07 (Consol. 2007); T EX . GOV ‘T CODE ANN . § 2054.126 (Vernon Supp. 2006); and V A. CODE ANN . §§ 2.2-3800-03 (2007). 182 M […]

[…] for improper disclosure.    “Routine use” is defined as “the use of such a rec ord for a purpose which is  compatible with the purpose for which it was collec ted.” 41 The Privacy Act Guidelines of  July 9, 1975 42 clarify this tautology by explaining that “routine  use” is not dependent on  frequency of use: it is meant to include both “the  common and ordinary uses to which  records are put” and “all of the proper and necessa ry uses even if such use occurs                                                     38 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3), (a)(7). 39 Several authors have recognized the expansive natu re of routine uses, but none have performed  categorical or comparative analysis of what they do  in SORNs. See, e.g., Nathan Alexander Sales,  Share  and Share Alike: Intelligence Agencies and Informat ion Sharing, 78 G EO . WASH . L. REV . 279 ( 2010) (only  briefly noting the routine use exception but not ob serving its scope in practice); Dennis J. McMahon,  Comment,  The Future Of Privacy In A Unified National Health  Information Infrastructure, 38 S ETON  HALL  L. REV . 787, 797 (2008) (discussing the routine use excep tion in the context of health information as  the “most glaring loophole”, but not observing how  it operates in practice); Fred H. Cate, Government Data  Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework , 43 H ARV . CIV. RIGHTS -C IV. LIBERTIES  L. REV . 435  (2008)(noting the routine use exemption); Jonathan  C. Bond, Defining Disclosure in a Digital Age:  Updating the Privacy Act for the Twenty-First Centu ry, 76 G EO . WASH […]