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[…] sensitive data (such as data on race or gender), and output analysis should be per – formed to detect potential proxies for sensitive features (such as zip codes). 15 We recommend perturbing sensitive features in input data and using the resulting model output to determine the model’s reliance on these sensitive features, in addition […]

[…] in great detail, and tie those records to students’ names. For example, Louisiana has 32 different codes for disciplinary actions, and Florida has wide-ranging categories for student code violations.14 The worry is that if disciplinary information is not expunged from school records, it could be used to deny students access to jobs in the […]

[…] In Proceedings of the 10 th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security , (ASIA CCS ’15). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 249 -260. https://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/won12/pub/_ASIACCS2015_A%20Secure%20Communication% 20Protocol%20for%20Drones% 20and%20Smart%20Objects.pdf 3DR Solo Geo -Fencing 7 flights to particular areas and preventing overbroad, unintended data collection that could capture personal data about in dividuals who are in […]

[…] Ener gy (DOE) has released a set of standards to guide privacy practices within the smart grid as well. 47 The purpose of the DOE Privacy Voluntary Code of Conduct (VCC) is to describe principles for voluntary adoption that (1) encourage innovation while appropriate ly protecting the privacy and confidentiality of Customer Data and […]

[…] companies, extracting audio and video chats, photographs, e-mails, documents and connection logs that enable analysts to track foreign targets….’ According to the Washington Post the programme is code-named PRISM and it apparently enables the NSA to collect personal data such as emails, photographs and videos from major internet providers such Microsoft, Google and Facebook.”47 […]

[…] central) servers) of) nine) leading) US) internet)companies,+ extracting+ audio+ and+ video+ chats,+ photographs,+ e]mails,’documents* and* connection* logs* that* enable* analysts* to* track* foreign*targets….’!According) to) the)Washington* Post*the$ programme$is# code]named& PRISM& and& it& apparently& enables& the& NSA& to& collect& personal&data$ such$ as$ emails,$ photographs$ and$ videos$ from$ major$ internet$providers)such)Microsoft,)Google)and)Facebook.”47”The$ Advocate$ General$ to$ the$ European$ Court$ of$ […]

[…] TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CTR ., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC ., PROTECTING STUDENT PRIVACY WHILE USING ONLINE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES : REQUIREMENTS AND BEST PRACTICES (Feb. 2014), available at http://ptac.ed.gov/sites/default/files/Student%20Privacy% 20and%20Online%20Educational%20S ervices%20(Febru ary%202014).pdf . 58 Letter from Arne Duncan, Sec’y of Educ., to Sen. Edward Markey, (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2014 -01 -10_Education_Privacy.pdf . 59 73 Fed. Reg. […]

[…] Economics of Personal Data: A Survey of Methodologies for Measuring Monetary Value, 220 OECD DIGITAL ECONOMY PAPERS 35 (2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k486qtxldmq -en. 4 See LAWRENCE LESSIG CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 159-62 (1999). For criticism, see e.g ., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as an Object , […]

[…] intermediaries acquire such 14See For eign Intelligence Surveillance Court Memorandum Opinion and Order of October 3, 2011 (redacted ) at 51 – 52 (available at http://www.dni.gov/files /documents/October%202011%20Bates%20Opinion% 20and%20Order%20Part%206.pdf ). 15 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 16 18 U.S.C. §2702 (a)(3) (2006). Page 7 records, however, they are free to sell or give them to […]

[…] : WHY  WE  AREN ’T  STOPPING  TOMORROW ’S TERRORISM  319 (2010).  52. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 50, at 196.  422 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy  to mental pain and distress, far greater than  could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.” 54 Although it remains  unclear how one could have greater “pain and distress” inflicted  by words than “by mere bodily injury,” as Brandeis and Warren  suggested, it follows that they would want fairly draconian con‐ trols on free speech and press rights if they felt this strongly  about the injury the  press could potentially inflict.  Taken to the extreme, however, giving such a notion the  force of law would put privacy rights on a direct collision  course with the First Amendment, and press rights in particu‐ lar. 55 For instance, Professor Eugene Volokh has argued that:   The difficulty is that the right to information privacy—my  right to control your communication of personally identifi‐ able information about me—is a right to have the govern‐ ment stop you from speaking about me. We already have a  code of “fair information practices,” and it is the First  Amendment, which generally  bars the government from  controlling the communication of information (either by di‐ rect regulation or through the authorization of private law‐ suits), whether the communication is “fair” or not. 56  If privacy rights could trump speech and press rights in the  fashion Brandeis and Warren suggested, a journalist would not  be allowed to conduct her daily business without fear of run‐ ning afoul of government regulation. Good reporting requires  that journalists gather and report facts, many of a personal na‐ ture.  If privacy rights were treated like intellectual property,  robust privacy rights could trump free speech rights, even  when the information being collected or distributed was truth‐ ful. Such a situation would raise significant First Amendment  53. See Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 A RIZ . L. REV. 1, 6  (1979).  54. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 50, at 196.  55. Cate & Litan, supra note 5, at 51 (“o the extent that privacy laws restrict  expression, even if that expression is commercial, the First Amendment imposes a  considerable burden on the government to demonstrate the need and effective‐ ness  of those laws.”).  […]