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De-Identification: A Critical Debate
[…] poorly de-identified, which makes for a great example of the need for a robust de-identification methodology. The NYC Taxi data used a one way hash without a salt, which is just poor practice, and takes us back to the earlier point that known methods need to be better disseminated. Using the NYC taxi example […]

FPF list of Federal Anti-discrimination laws
[…] L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13)). The Supreme Court upheld the FTC’s ability to enforce the Robinson-Patman Act in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). However, the Robinson-Patman Act requires “competitive injury,” and is not designed to serve as a consumer protection law. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination […]

Thierer_A Framework for Benefit Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates
[…] N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Mar. 19, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/19/what -would -you -pay -for-privacy . 185 Id. 186 Jim Harper & Solveig Singleton, With A Grain of Salt: What Consu mer Privacy Surveys Don’t Tell Us (June 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=299930 (“rivacy surveys in particular . . . suffer from the […]

Slobogin_Making the Most of US v Jones in a Surveillance Society
Vanderbilt University Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Number 12 -29 Law & Economics Working Paper Number 12 -22 Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory Ch ristopher Slobogin Vanderbilt University Law School This paper can be downloaded without charge from […]

TENE_Final
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY VOLUME 19, ISSUE 1: OCTOBER 2017 125 TAMING THE GOLEM: CHALLENGES OF ETHICAL ALGORITHMIC DECISION-MAKING Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky* The prospect of digital manipulation on major online platforms reached fever pitch in the last election cycle in the United States. Jonathan Zittrain’s concern about “digital gerrymandering” found […]

The Impact of Generative AI on Kids’ Privacy, Safety, and Security
[…] Intelligence and Security, Member for Wills Speakers: Associate Professor Campbell Wilson, Co-director of the Ai for Law Enforcement and Community Safety (AiLECS) Lab, Monash University Dr. Jessica Lake, Senior Lecturer, University of Melbourne Dr. John Coyne, Head of the Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre and Head of Strategic Policing and Law Enforcement, Australian Strategic […]

The Old Line State Does Something New on Privacy
[…] process personal data. Section 14–4612, for example, preserves controllers’ and processors’ ability to collect, use, or retain personal data for certain internal uses, such as identifying and repairing technical errors or performing internal operations that are either (1) “reasonably aligned with” the consumer’s reasonable expectations or can be “reasonably anticipated based on the consumer’s […]

FPF Vehicle Safety Systems_March2024 FINAL (2)
[…] number of key starts, for instance. Should data be processed, stored, or retained off the vehicle, it should be for the limited purpose of diagnosing, servicing, or repairing the technology. Drivers should have clear and easily accessible means of accessing and deleting personal information. 89 Allowing a person to whom data relates to request […]

FINAL FPF-PPPM-2024-Digest-PRINT-R4-singles
[…] of California at Berkeley in 2004. His research interests include big data systems, collaborative data science platforms, machine learning lifecycle management, data privacy, graph analytics, and data lakes. He has authored or co-authored over 80 research publications, with an h-index of 51; he is a recipient of an NSF Career award, and has received […]

FPF Vehicle Safety Systems_March2024 FINAL
[…] number of key starts, for instance. Should data be processed, stored, or retained off the vehicle, it should be for the limited purpose of diagnosing, servicing, or repairing the technology. Drivers should have clear and easily accessible means of accessing and deleting personal information. 89 Allowing a person to whom data relates to request […]