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[…] sensitive data (such as data on race or gender), and output analysis should be per – formed to detect potential proxies for sensitive features (such as zip codes). 15 We recommend perturbing sensitive features in input data and using the resulting model output to determine the model’s reliance on these sensitive features, in addition […]

[…] a network, or is informally shared. Most people think that maintaining their privacy is important. Despite numerous articles bemoaning young people’s lack of attention to privacy issues, today’s children do care about privacy; studies have found that the attitudes of older and younger people about privacy are similar, and a 2012 Microsoft study found […]

[…] Rule promises to open the skies to even more drones .3 In May 2016 , a diverse group of leading stakeholders reached consensus on best practices to promote priva cy, transparency, and accountability for commercial and recreational drone operation. 4 The best practices urge drone users to take reasonable, practical steps to safeguard personal […]

[…] there is an important difference between s peech recognition and voice recognition — the latter indicating biometric identification. The majority of speech -enabled devices on the market today are not designed for the purpose of uniquely identifying a person through the biometric characteristics of he r voice. Instead, they aim to create products for […]

[…] to spy on non-citizens outside of one’s own country – is, as applied to Europeans, contrary to the views of many in Europe about what is proper today for an ally such as the US. Action: In 2014 President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive-28 (PPD-28),109 which I consider a historic document. Binding on all […]

[…] the’objections’is’that’Europeans’believe’that’EU’citizens’deserve’similar’treatment’to’US’citizens’ when’ it’ comes’ to’ US’ surveillance’ activities.’ ‘ The’ longstanding’ international’practice’–’the’greater’latitude’to’spy’on’non]citizens’outside’of’one’s’own’country’–’is,’ as’ applied’ to’ Europeans,’ contrary’ to’ the’ views’ of’ many’ in’ Europe’ about’ what’ is’proper’ today‘for’an’ally’such’as’the’US.”Action:’In’ 2014′ President’ Obama’ issued’ Presidential’ Policy’ Directive]28′ (PPD]28),109’which’I’consider’a’historic’document.”Binding’on’all’US’intelligence’agencies’for’ their’ signals’ intelligence’ activities,’ the’ directive:’ “articulates’ principles’ to’ guide’why,’ whether,’ when,’ and’ how’ the’ United’ States’ conducts’ […]

[…] mechanism introduced by FERPA, but also forewarns its shortcomings. FERPA F undamentals In 1974, merely twelve days after Presiden t Richard Nixon’s resignation, the Buckley Amendment, known today as the FERPA, was signed into law by Nixon’s successor, President Gerald Ford. 5 At its core, FERPA is a budget statute, which applies to educational […]

[…] third parties. That is, big data collection practices per se , rather than bad uses or outcomes, are sufficient to trigger an individua l’s privacy interests. 1 Today, big data collection practices are for the most part unregulated. As collection, retention, and analysis practices become increasingly sophisticated, these threats * Justin Brookman is Director […]

[…] intermediaries acquire such 14See For eign Intelligence Surveillance Court Memorandum Opinion and Order of October 3, 2011 (redacted ) at 51 – 52 (available at http://www.dni.gov/files /documents/October%202011%20Bates%20Opinion% 20and%20Order%20Part%206.pdf ). 15 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 16 18 U.S.C. §2702 (a)(3) (2006). Page 7 records, however, they are free to sell or give them to […]

[…] 416 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy  The Pursuit of Privacy 417  sponding commitments and costs that must be taken into account  since government regulation always entails tradeoffs. 29  Therefore, even as America struggles to reach political con‐ sensus over the scope of privacy rights in the information age,  it makes sense to find methods and mechanisms—most of  which will lie outside of the law—that can help citizens cope  with social and technological changes that affect their privacy.  Part  III will outline some of the ways citizens can pursue and  achieve greater personal privacy.  B. On the Problem of “Creepiness” as the   Standard of Privacy Harm  Precisely because the scope of privacy rights is so difficult to  delimit, defining what constitutes “harm” in the context of in‐ formation sharing and  collection is similarly complicated. Some  scholars have attempted to better delineate the nature and scope  of privacy harms, but consensus remains elusive. 30 The recent  FTC reports offer no clarification on the matter either.31  This Part focuses on the problems associated with one par‐ ticular alleged privacy harm commonly associated with new  information technologies and practices: “creepiness.” Practi‐ cally every new information technology launched  today is ini‐ tially labeled “creepy” and creepiness is often the primary (or  only) alleged harm that is cited as  the basis of much online pri‐ 29. See Thomas M. Lenard & Paul H. Rubin, The FTC and Privacy: We Don’t Need  No Stinking Data, T HE  ANTITRUST  SOURCE , Oct. 2012, at 3,  http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/oct12_le nard_10_22f.authcheckdam.pdf (“It seems clear that greater privacy protections will  involve tradeoffs—costs to Internet businesses, as well as to consumers. The com‐ mercial use of online information produces a range of benefits, including advertis‐ ing targeted to consumers’ interests, advertising‐supported services (such as email,  search  engines, and fraud detection), and a reduction in other threats, such as mal‐ ware and phishing. More privacy, in the current context, means less information  available for the marketplace and therefore fewer of these benefits to consumers.  Even if the services are still offered, they will be of lower quality as  providers will  have less money and less data to use in providing services.”) (footnotes omitted).  30. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 I ND . L.J.  1 (2011);  Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 H […]